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say!  But at least I can conclude that in eight provinces the approval of legislatures was not considered an essential component of political legitimacy for these constitutional amendments.

The Supreme Court of Canada

Let us turn to another important actor in the constitutional drama, the Supreme Court of Canada.

Throughout this period there was widespread support in the press for the whole question being put to the Supreme Court to decide whether or not the process for patriation and amendment was proper.18

It appears that the federal government was not so enthusiastic about putting that question before the Supreme Court; it never did so, although it alone had the power to take a direct reference.

The dissenting provincial governments — the “gang of eight” — appeared to have a somewhat ambivalent approach to judicial review.  For those provinces opposed to entrenchment of a Charter, with their fears of turning over to the courts the making of public policy, it seemed to be inconsistent to go to the courts in order to settle what was essentially a political issue.  Some provincial representatives, while the cases were pending before the courts, warned that judicial decisions really could not resolve the problem and, even if the law were on the side of the federal government, that should not settle the matter.  After the decision of the Supreme Court, however, those same representatives on both sides of the issue seemed to embrace the Court’s various judgments for whatever comfort they could derive.

I wish to make two observations about the ultimate role of the Supreme Court.  First, I think it is undoubtedly true that the Supreme Court judgment had a decisive effect on the outcome of the First Ministers’ conference which followed in November, 1981.  At that point, I had been attending these conferences for some twenty-one years, and I was struck by the different tone of the November, 1981 meeting.  For the first time it was clear that unanimity was not required for an agreement to be reached.  It was clear, on the one hand, that the federal government legally could proceed without the consent of even the majority of the provinces.  On the other hand, it was clear that if substantial agreement of the provinces were not achieved, the judgment of the six Supreme Court judges on the question of constitutional conventions could be used with considerable
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18. See, e.g., “The Constitution and the Court”, Toronto Globe and Mail, editorial, Oct. 15, 1980; “Court test has merit”, Ottawa Citizen, editorial, Oct. 15, 1980; “Send constitution to Supreme Court”, Montreal Gazette, editorial, Oct. 16, 1980; “How our system works”, Financial Post, editorial, Jan. 10, 1981; Richard Gwyn, column, Toronto Star, Feb. 5, 1981.

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3 thoughts on “3-31

  1. Strayer said:
    “Throughout this period there was widespread support in the press for the whole question being put to the Supreme Court to decide whether or not the process for patriation and amendment was proper.
     
    It appears that the federal government was not so enthusiastic about putting that question before the Supreme Court; it never did so, although it alone had the power to take a direct reference.
     
    The dissenting provincial governments — the “gang of eight” — appeared to have a somewhat ambivalent approach to judicial review.”

    As I have pointed out in my comments on page 3-19, advisories are not judicial.  They are therefore not “judicial review”.  Putting questions to the courts is not “judicial review”, it is an advisory process which our lawful Constitution does not allow.

    So, why the pretense that it is “judicial”?  Precisely because the public are deceived by it.  They think that a “court” has pronounced, and being largely law-abiding, they comply.  In the case of the 1998 ‘secession’ opinion, the determination to make the advisories seem judicial is designed to control not just the public, but the legal field as well.

    The non-judicial “section 53 board” in 1998 drafted a bill for the rubber-stamp of the post-coup parliament.  The object of the bill is to force all of Canada to allow the federal level to “negotiate” the political dismantling of Canada with Quebec.  Quebec has never been seceding; it’s being used by the federal level as a front to allow itself to perpetrate high treason with impunity; to merge Canada into a Leninist regional union by “accession” to European “treaties” which can only be done by seeming to give each of the provinces and territories “sovereign” international powers to sign them!  In other words, to sign their own death warrants!  Because they will be dismantled once they “transfer” their stolen powers “over” into the new international multicultural city-states, and “up” into the new continental and hemispheric regional governments.

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  2. Notice that Strayer then says:

    “I wish to make two observations about the ultimate role of the Supreme Court.  First, I think it is undoubtedly true that the Supreme Court judgment had a decisive effect on the outcome of the First Ministers’ conference which followed in November, 1981.”

    If there were any persons in the provincial governments who were not under control by the coup, the charade of the advisories dressed up and dramatized in the media spotlight as “judicial review”, would have brought them under control; while subduing the Canadian public, who were fooled into thinking something “legal” had happened; and that “government” (the putsch running Canada and some or all of the Provinces) could go ahead and do as it wished.

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  3. My point about “control” is more clear from Strayer’s admission at page 3-32:

    “The other observation I would make is that once the case was decided, few people seemed to question the political legitimacy of the Supreme Court itself in rendering such a judgment.”

    Note the deliberate misuse of the words “case”, “decided”, “judgment” and “Court”.

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